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  Rather	  than	  one	  view	  that	  goes	  by	  the	  name	  “essentialism,”	  there	  are	  many.	  This	  entry	  clarifies	  and	  emphasizes	  important	  differences	  and	  other	  relations	  between	  some	  varieties	  of	  essentialism.	  But	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  begin	  with	  what	  most	  essentialisms	  have	  in	  common.	  They	  are	  views	  about	  belonging.	  Most	  of	  them	  further	  specify	  the	  general	  idea	  that	  for	  some	  entity	  to	  belong	  to	  a	  particular	  category	  or	  individual,	  it	  must	  have	  certain	  properties.	  Those	  properties	  are	  essential	  properties	  for	  belonging	  to	  the	  category	  or	  individual	  in	  question.	  For	  example,	  essentialism	  about	  the	  biological	  category	  “platypus”	  might	  say	  that	  an	  organism	  is	  a	  platypus	  only	  if	  that	  organism	  has	  a	  certain	  cluster	  of	  genes	  and	  a	  particular	  ancestry,	  where	  these	  genes	  and	  ancestry	  are	  essential	  properties	  for	  being	  a	  platypus.	  Essentialism	  about	  the	  March	  2011	  dissolution	  of	  the	  40th	  Canadian	  Parliament	  (an	  individual	  event	  in	  Canadian	  politics)	  might	  say	  that	  any	  event	  belonged	  to	  or	  was	  a	  part	  of	  that	  dissolution	  just	  in	  case	  it	  was	  one	  of	  the	  important	  proximate	  causes	  of	  that	  dissolution.	  Additionally,	  most	  essentialisms	  imply	  that	  the	  properties	  essential	  for	  belonging	  to	  some	  category	  or	  individual	  together	  form	  the	  essence	  of	  (or	  essence	  of	  belonging	  to)	  that	  category	  or	  individual.	  If	  having	  a	  particular	  cluster	  of	  genes	  and	  certain	  ancestry	  are	  the	  only	  essential	  properties	  of	  being	  a	  platypus,	  then	  together	  they	  form	  the	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platypus	  essence.	  More	  generally,	  an	  essential	  property	  for	  belonging	  to	  X	  is	  necessary	  for	  belonging	  to	  X;	  having	  the	  essence	  for	  belonging	  to	  X	  is,	  in	  ordinary	  environments,	  
sufficient.	  To	  see	  how	  varieties	  of	  essentialism	  elaborate	  this	  basic	  view	  in	  different	  ways,	  this	  entry	  first	  discusses	  philosophical	  essentialisms,	  including	  those	  in	  metaphysics	  and	  philosophy	  of	  science	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  thinking	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  social	  science	  categories	  such	  as	  “economic	  individual”,	  “urban	  city”,	  “black	  person”,	  and	  “gay	  man”.	  The	  entry	  then	  more	  briefly	  discusses	  psychological	  essentialisms	  concerning	  folk	  beliefs	  about	  such	  categories.	  The	  discussions	  reveal	  how	  several	  essentialist	  views	  connect	  with	  other	  issues,	  including	  categorization	  of	  kinds,	  induction,	  scientific	  realism,	  explanation,	  social	  constructivism,	  reductionism,	  the	  psychology	  of	  concepts,	  and	  social	  policy.	  	  
Philosophical	  Essentialisms	  Of	  the	  many	  philosophical	  essentialist	  views	  and	  issues,	  this	  entry	  discusses	  metaphysical	  and	  then	  scientific	  ones.	  	  
Philosophy:	  Metaphysical	  Essentialist	  Views	  and	  Issues	  Ancient	  Greek	  philosophers	  such	  as	  Aristotle	  were	  the	  first	  people	  known	  to	  develop	  essentialist	  views,	  typically	  to	  address	  metaphysical	  problems.	  These	  include	  explaining	  how	  anything	  can	  be	  generated	  out	  of	  other	  things	  and	  how	  a	  thing	  can	  persist	  through	  some	  changes	  but	  not	  others.	  One	  might	  say	  that	  a	  particular	  platypus	  can	  survive	  the	  loss	  of	  its	  tail	  because	  having	  a	  tail	  is	  not	  an	  essential	  property	  for	  being	  a	  platypus.	  	  The	  popularity	  of	  metaphysical	  essentialisms	  has	  fluctuated	  dramatically	  since	  Aristotle’s	  time.	  Working	  in	  the	  1970s	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  linguistic	  reference	  (e.g.,	  to	  what	  do	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the	  terms	  “Richard	  Nixon”	  and	  “gold”	  respectively	  refer?),	  Saul	  Kripke	  and	  Hilary	  Putnam	  initiated	  the	  present	  resurgence	  in	  metaphysical	  essentialisms.	  Some	  of	  these	  abstract	  from	  any	  particular	  sorts	  of	  entities	  to	  focus	  on	  entities	  in	  general	  (including	  objects,	  processes,	  events,	  groups,	  nations,	  and	  so	  on).	  These	  views	  often	  articulate	  theories	  about	  what	  properties	  entities	  have	  necessarily.	  A	  spectrum	  of	  such	  views	  range	  from	  the	  claim	  that	  any	  entity	  has	  all	  its	  properties	  necessarily,	  as	  Gottfried	  Leibniz	  claimed	  in	  the	  17th	  century,	  to	  the	  view	  that	  the	  only	  properties	  that	  any	  entities	  have	  necessarily	  are	  trivial	  ones,	  such	  as	  the	  property	  of	  being	  either	  red	  or	  not	  red.	  	  As	  metaphysicians	  have	  made	  their	  essentialist	  views	  increasingly	  responsive	  to	  work	  in	  other	  fields,	  general	  essentialisms	  have	  fragmented	  into	  more	  specific	  views	  about	  limited	  ranges	  of	  entities,	  e.g.,	  linguistic,	  biological	  or	  social	  entities.	  Nevertheless	  some	  general	  metaphysical	  issues	  arise	  across	  several	  of	  these	  narrower	  views.	  One	  issue	  concerns	  the	  ontological	  categories	  with	  which	  essential	  properties	  associate.	  For	  example	  take	  the	  view	  that	  some	  of	  an	  entity’s	  essential	  properties	  are	  those	  without	  which	  it	  would	  not	  exist.	  Such	  properties	  individuate	  (set	  apart)	  the	  fundamental	  kinds	  to	  which	  entities	  belong,	  where	  “fundamental	  kind”	  names	  an	  ontological	  category.	  The	  essences	  formed	  by	  these	  essential	  properties	  are	  kind	  essences.	  Another	  sot	  of	  kind	  essence	  is	  one	  that	  individuates	  a	  non-­‐fundamental	  kind,	  one	  that	  an	  entity	  can	  pass	  in	  and	  out	  of	  without	  perishing.	  The	  essential	  properties	  composing	  such	  an	  essence	  are	  required	  for	  belonging	  to	  the	  non-­‐fundamental	  kind,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  for	  existing.	  If	  “republic”	  names	  a	  kind,	  it	  is	  of	  this	  sort;	  Australia	  doesn’t	  currently	  possess	  the	  essential	  properties	  for	  being	  a	  republic,	  but	  it	  one	  day	  might.	  Some	  of	  the	  problems	  that	  scientists	  and	  philosophers	  of	  science	  have	  perceived	  for	  essentialism	  tacitly	  presuppose	  essentialism	  is	  only	  about	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fundamental	  kinds;	  but	  many	  kinds	  of	  interest	  in	  science	  are	  non-­‐fundamental,	  and	  so	  such	  problems	  do	  not	  afflict	  them.	  	  All	  kind	  essences,	  whether	  associated	  with	  fundamental	  kinds	  or	  otherwise,	  are	  ones	  that	  in	  principle	  more	  than	  one	  entity	  can	  have.	  Kinds	  can	  have	  more	  than	  one	  member.	  
Individual	  essences,	  in	  contrast,	  are	  made	  of	  properties	  essential	  to	  and	  had	  by	  only	  one	  entity.	  If	  Australia	  has	  an	  individual	  essence,	  it	  probably	  involves	  the	  unique	  way	  it	  originated.	  	  	  The	  ontological	  issue	  relates	  to	  identity.	  Essences	  that	  individuate	  fundamental	  kinds	  determine	  the	  metaphysical	  identities	  of	  the	  members	  of	  those	  kinds.	  For	  instance,	  were	  
platypus	  a	  fundamental	  kind,	  then	  any	  organism	  with	  the	  platypus	  essence	  would	  fundamentally	  be	  a	  platypus;	  that	  essence	  would	  fix	  the	  organism’s	  identity	  so	  that	  it	  could	  not	  cease	  to	  be	  a	  platypus	  without	  expiring	  altogether.	  Interestingly	  some	  plausible	  interpretations	  of	  biology	  suggest	  that	  the	  species	  that	  evolutionary	  theory	  recognizes	  are	  not	  fundamental	  (kinds	  or	  otherwise),	  allowing	  that	  any	  organism	  could	  survive	  a	  change	  in	  species,	  and	  even	  belong	  to	  no	  species	  or	  more	  than	  one.	  This	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  every	  essentialism	  about	  these	  species	  is	  hopeless,	  because	  it	  leaves	  open	  that	  each	  species	  that	  evolutionary	  theory	  recognizes	  is	  individuated	  by	  essential	  properties	  of	  the	  sort	  associated	  with	  non-­‐fundamental	  kinds	  such	  as	  “republic.”	  An	  essentialist	  about	  social	  science	  categories,	  such	  as	  “free	  market”,	  “woman”,	  or	  “gay	  man”,	  likewise	  need	  not	  claim	  that	  the	  essential	  properties	  they	  recognize	  determine	  identity.	  Identity	  issues	  underlie	  views	  concerning	  locality	  of	  essential	  properties.	  Intrinsicalism	  is	  a	  common	  though	  seldom	  defended	  presumption	  about	  the	  locality	  of	  essential	  properties,	  which	  says	  that	  any	  essential	  properties	  must	  be	  intrinsic	  properties	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of	  their	  bearers.	  A	  subject’s	  intrinsic	  properties	  are	  realized	  by	  that	  subject’s	  internal	  features	  (e.g.,	  some	  muscle	  internal	  to	  your	  chest	  realizes	  your	  property	  of	  having	  a	  heart).	  One	  motivation	  for	  intrinsicalism	  applies	  only	  to	  essentialism	  about	  fundamental	  kinds.	  Consider:	  were	  any	  of	  the	  essential	  properties	  that	  individuate	  these	  kinds	  not	  intrinsic,	  they	  would	  be	  extrinsic.	  A	  subject’s	  extrinsic	  properties	  are	  realized	  at	  least	  in	  part	  by	  features	  external	  to	  her,	  such	  as	  being	  related	  to	  other	  entities	  or	  processes	  in	  particular	  ways.	  But	  if	  such	  extrinsic	  properties	  are	  among	  those	  essential	  for	  belonging	  to	  a	  fundamental	  kind,	  then,	  absurdly,	  members	  of	  those	  kinds	  could	  perish	  due	  to	  changes	  in	  their	  extrinsic	  conditions	  and	  without	  any	  internal	  changes	  to	  themselves.	  In	  contrast,	  because	  the	  essential	  properties	  associated	  with	  non-­‐fundamental	  kinds	  do	  not	  determine	  identity,	  they	  can	  be	  extrinsic	  without	  generating	  such	  absurdities.	  More	  generally,	  several	  authors	  have	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  no	  barrier	  to	  extrinsic	  property	  essentialism	  about	  non-­‐fundamental	  kinds,	  and	  that	  we	  often	  have	  good	  theoretical	  reasons	  to	  recognize	  these.	  This	  allows	  such	  forms	  of	  essentialism	  to	  agree	  with	  the	  common	  claim	  that	  membership	  in	  many	  social	  categories,	  such	  as	  “free	  agent”	  or	  “Canadian”,	  is	  (partially	  or	  wholly)	  extrinsically	  or	  relationally	  determined.	  	  Several	  other	  metaphysical	  nuances	  in	  contemporary	  essentialist	  views	  belie	  traditional	  understandings	  of	  essentialisms.	  Essentialism	  about	  kinds	  is	  often	  said	  to	  imply	  
fixity	  or	  immutability	  about	  hierarchies	  or	  networks	  of	  kinds,	  e.g.,	  that	  all	  kinds	  of	  chemical	  elements	  form	  an	  unchanging	  and	  static	  set	  that	  the	  periodical	  table	  represents.	  But	  many	  essentialisms	  are	  compatible	  with	  dynamic	  networks	  of	  kinds,	  where	  some	  kinds	  are	  generated	  out	  of	  others.	  Indeed,	  the	  chemical	  elements	  probably	  arose	  in	  this	  way.	  Some	  authors	  worry	  that	  this	  ensures	  that	  the	  boundaries	  of	  these	  essentially	  determined	  kinds	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are	  vague,	  making	  non-­‐arbitrary	  identification	  of	  them	  impossible.	  Authors	  such	  as	  Elliott	  Sober	  reply	  that	  there	  are	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  a	  kind’s	  having	  a	  vague	  essence	  and	  vague	  boundaries	  is	  compatible	  with	  it	  being	  determinate	  and	  non-­‐arbitrary.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  startling	  check	  on	  traditional	  metaphysical	  presumptions	  about	  essentialism	  concerns	  necessity.	  On	  the	  increasingly	  popular	  homeostatic	  property	  cluster	  (HPC)	  view	  of	  some	  kinds,	  no	  single	  one	  of	  the	  properties	  that	  helps	  individuate	  an	  HPC	  kind	  need	  be	  necessary	  for	  kind	  membership;	  rather,	  some	  sub-­‐set	  of	  these	  properties	  is	  sufficient	  in	  each	  case.	  If	  “Irish	  person”	  names	  an	  ethnic	  kind,	  for	  example,	  it	  is	  probably	  one	  of	  these.	  There	  need	  not	  be	  one	  property	  that	  all	  Irish	  people	  share,	  but	  rather	  a	  cluster	  of	  individuative	  properties	  of	  which	  each	  has	  some	  sub-­‐set,	  with	  different	  Irish	  people	  having	  different	  sub-­‐sets.	  (Some	  other	  people	  are	  neither	  determinately	  Irish	  nor	  determinately	  not	  Irish.)	  This	  descendent	  of	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein’s	  notion	  of	  family	  resemblance	  would	  be	  a	  non-­‐essentialist	  view,	  were	  it	  not	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  individuative	  cluster	  is	  necessary	  rather	  than	  any	  single	  property	  in	  it.	  On	  this	  possibility,	  although	  there	  is	  no	  single	  property	  that	  each	  Irish	  person	  must	  have,	  to	  be	  Irish,	  a	  person	  
must	  have	  some	  sub-­‐set	  or	  other	  of	  the	  properties	  in	  the	  cluster.	  Such	  views	  have	  been	  made	  consistent	  with	  Kripke’s	  and	  Putnam’s	  work	  on	  linguistic	  reference,	  and	  define	  a	  new	  form	  of	  essentialism	  that	  permits	  the	  prodigious	  variation	  within	  kinds	  that	  dooms	  many	  traditional	  essentialist	  accounts	  of	  those	  kinds.	  	  	  
Philosophy:	  Scientific	  Essentialist	  Views	  and	  Issues	  	  Metaphysical	  and	  scientific	  essentialisms	  overlap.	  Work	  in	  various	  sciences	  and	  philosophy	  of	  science	  motivates	  some	  of	  the	  nuanced	  metaphysical	  positions	  described	  above.	  In	  the	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other	  direction,	  refinements	  in	  metaphysics	  have	  made	  essentialist	  views	  more	  applicable	  in	  some	  scientific	  domains	  than	  they	  previously	  were.	  Nevertheless	  teasing	  out	  scientific	  essentialist	  views	  and	  issues	  from	  metaphysical	  ones	  clarifies	  issues	  both	  in	  general	  
philosophy	  of	  science	  and	  in	  philosophies	  of	  particular	  sciences.	  Take	  these	  in	  turn.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  renewing	  interest	  in	  essentialism	  among	  metaphysicians,	  Kripke	  and	  Putnam	  helped	  rejuvenate	  the	  Aristotelian	  idea	  that	  essentialism	  is	  important	  to	  empirically	  minded	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  They	  did	  this	  partially	  by	  convincing	  many	  researchers	  that	  some	  scientific	  inquiry	  consists	  in	  empirical	  search	  for,	  and	  a	  posteriori	  discovery	  of,	  kind	  essences.	  For	  example,	  chemistry	  has	  involved	  not	  only	  searches	  for	  chemical	  causes	  of	  certain	  phenomena,	  but	  also	  determining	  what	  particular	  chemical	  elements	  and	  compounds	  are.	  Their	  results	  often	  seem	  to	  tie	  these	  kinds	  to	  microstructural	  essences:	  having	  79	  protons	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  being	  a	  gold	  atom,	  and	  being	  composed	  exclusively	  of	  H20	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  being	  (pure)	  water.	  Kripke’s	  and	  Putnam’s	  intuitively	  driven	  thought	  experiments	  have	  had	  a	  greater	  role	  in	  inspiring	  a	  essential	  interpretation	  of	  some	  scientific	  inquiry	  than	  their	  semantic	  theses.	  	  Brian	  Ellis	  has	  developed	  an	  essentialist	  interpretation	  of	  some	  scientific	  inquiry,	  in	  a	  view	  he	  calls	  new	  scientific	  essentialism.	  Although	  he	  hesitates	  to	  apply	  the	  view	  to	  the	  social	  sciences,	  we	  will	  see	  why	  others	  are	  cautiously	  optimistic.	  Ellis	  claims	  that	  his	  scientific	  essentialism	  best	  fits	  the	  facts	  of	  inquiry	  and	  discovery	  in	  much	  of	  physics	  and	  chemistry,	  and	  that	  it	  offers	  the	  best	  philosophical	  analysis	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  nature	  discovered	  in	  those	  disciplines.	  Roughly,	  he	  proposes	  that	  laws	  of	  nature	  are	  grounded	  in	  the	  microstructural	  essences	  of	  the	  kinds	  over	  which	  those	  laws	  range.	  The	  laws	  are	  exceptionless	  because	  the	  members	  of	  the	  kinds	  over	  which	  the	  laws	  range	  all	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possess	  the	  essences	  that	  make	  the	  laws	  true.	  According	  to	  Ellis	  those	  essences	  are	  metaphysically	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  kind	  membership.	  On	  Ellis’s	  view,	  essential	  properties	  of	  scientific	  interest	  must	  be	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  of	  characteristic	  behaviors	  of	  entities	  that	  have	  them.	  Having	  79	  protons,	  for	  instance,	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  of	  gold’s	  melting	  behaviors	  and	  interactions	  with	  other	  elements.	  This	  explanatory	  salience	  of	  essential	  properties	  is	  supposed	  to	  make	  them	  relevant	  to	  the	  general	  philosophy	  of	  science	  issue	  of	  induction	  too.	  The	  explanatory	  salience	  of	  the	  essential	  properties	  ensures	  the	  predictive	  reliability	  of	  generalizations	  that	  range	  over	  the	  kinds	  individuated	  by	  those	  properties.	  	  The	  new	  scientific	  essentialism	  connects	  with	  the	  further	  issue	  of	  the	  proper	  aims	  of	  
science.	  It	  supports	  the	  traditional	  view	  that	  some	  sciences	  do	  and	  should	  aim	  to	  construct	  classifications	  comprising	  categories	  that	  represent	  kinds	  over	  which	  generalizations	  range.	  The	  classifications	  are	  theories	  about	  natural	  order.	  These	  improve	  as	  they	  more	  accurately	  represent	  kinds,	  laws	  or	  generalizations,	  and	  relations	  between	  these.	  Whereas	  empiricists	  about	  the	  aims	  of	  science	  often	  transform	  this	  view	  into	  an	  instrumentalist	  or	  
anti-­‐realist	  one	  that	  nowhere	  appeals	  to	  microstructural	  essences,	  Ellis	  argues	  that	  his	  foundational	  appeal	  to	  such	  essences	  develops	  the	  view	  into	  a	  version	  of	  scientific	  realism.	  He	  claims	  that	  science	  discovers	  these	  real	  essences,	  discovers	  that	  they	  are	  essences,	  and	  that	  they	  are	  intrinsic	  causal	  powers	  that	  members	  of	  corresponding	  kinds	  have	  
determinately	  without	  variation.	  The	  kind	  distinctions	  they	  underwrite	  are	  then	  nature’s	  distinctions,	  not	  ours:	  real,	  absolute,	  and	  categorical.	  The	  reality	  of	  essential	  distinctions	  and	  the	  naturalness	  of	  kinds	  are	  hotly	  contested	  issues	  when	  one	  moves	  from	  general	  philosophy	  of	  science	  to	  the	  philosophy	  of	  particular	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social	  sciences.	  There	  is	  an	  overwhelming	  consensus	  that	  most	  of	  the	  kinds	  these	  sciences	  study	  and	  generalize	  about	  are	  not	  individuated	  by	  real	  essences,	  and	  are	  socially	  
constructed	  rather	  than	  natural.	  Some	  examples:	  “individual”	  and	  “market”	  in	  economics,	  “black”	  and	  “white”	  in	  race	  studies,	  “capitalist	  city”	  in	  urban	  sociology,	  “woman”	  in	  feminist	  political	  science	  and	  sociology,	  and	  “emerging	  adult”	  in	  developmental	  psychology.	  When	  saying	  that	  essentialism	  about	  these	  categories	  is	  mistaken,	  most	  critics	  mean	  something	  like	  the	  “absolute”	  and	  “categorical”	  essentialism	  that	  Ellis	  favors	  for	  physics	  and	  chemistry.	  However,	  they	  typically	  do	  not	  have	  in	  mind	  Ellis’s	  physical	  and	  chemical	  levels.	  One	  of	  the	  alternative	  levels	  they	  sometimes	  have	  in	  mind	  is	  the	  genetic	  level	  of	  biology.	  Any	  real	  essence	  distinctions	  here	  are	  widely	  thought	  to	  fail	  to	  account	  for	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  mentioned	  social	  kinds.	  This	  can	  be	  called	  failure	  of	  categorical	  real	  
genetic	  essentialism	  about	  social	  kinds	  (CRGESK).	  CRGESK	  is	  a	  non-­‐starter	  for	  some	  social	  categories.	  Nobody	  ever	  thought	  that	  a	  genetic	  distinction	  accounts	  for	  the	  category	  “middleman.”	  But	  for	  other	  categories,	  such	  as	  “white	  male,”	  the	  failure	  of	  CRGESK	  is	  more	  interesting.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  best	  reason	  given	  for	  this	  failure	  leaves	  open	  other	  real	  essentialist	  accounts	  of	  some	  social	  kinds,	  and	  some	  authors	  note	  that	  several	  debates	  in	  social	  sciences	  clarify	  once	  we	  appreciate	  this.	  	  The	  best	  reason	  to	  reject	  CRGESK	  concerns	  variation	  and	  explanation.	  For	  any	  social	  kind,	  there	  are	  no	  genetic	  properties	  that	  both	  a)	  are	  shared	  by	  all	  human	  members	  of	  the	  kinds,	  and	  b)	  explain	  behaviors	  common	  to	  those	  members.	  The	  evidence	  for	  this	  is	  inductive,	  from	  genetics	  and	  population	  studies.	  It	  entails	  that	  for	  social	  kinds	  there	  are	  no	  genetic	  properties	  that	  could	  meet	  the	  necessity	  and	  explanatory	  conditions	  that	  Ellis	  places	  on	  real	  essential	  properties.	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This	  leaves	  open	  two	  (combinable)	  options	  for	  alternative	  sorts	  of	  biological	  real	  
essentialism	  about	  some	  social	  kinds.	  First,	  one	  can	  expand	  the	  candidate	  essential	  properties	  to	  biological	  ones	  other	  than	  genetic	  ones.	  For	  instance,	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  for	  common	  and	  explanatory	  neurological	  properties	  that	  may	  individuate	  economic	  
individual	  as	  a	  real	  kind.	  These	  properties	  may	  be	  intrinsic	  properties	  of	  human	  persons.	  But	  as	  noted	  above,	  essential	  properties	  need	  not	  be	  intrinsic	  for	  non-­‐fundamental	  kinds	  that	  sciences	  study.	  Races	  are	  conceived	  as	  such	  kinds	  when	  authors	  argue	  that	  extrinsic,	  genealogical	  properties	  of	  people	  account	  for	  the	  race	  distinctions	  between	  them.	  	  Second,	  authors	  such	  as	  Ron	  Mallon	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  social	  kinds	  in	  question	  are	  HPC	  kinds.	  This	  allows	  that	  the	  properties	  individuating	  them,	  whether	  neurological,	  genealogical	  or	  of	  other	  sorts,	  need	  not	  be	  possessed	  by	  all	  kind	  members.	  The	  prevalence	  of	  variation	  among	  members	  of	  each	  social	  kind	  would	  seem	  to	  require	  this	  modification	  of	  any	  essentialist	  account	  of	  them,	  whether	  biological	  or	  not.	  Whether	  authors	  call	  the	  resulting	  view	  a	  new	  form	  of	  “essentialism”	  is	  beside	  the	  point.	  Authors	  have	  challenged	  the	  above-­‐described	  essentialist	  move	  from	  genetic	  to	  other	  sorts	  of	  biological	  properties.	  However,	  authors	  are	  now	  realizing	  that	  the	  resulting	  debates	  between	  the	  biologically	  inclined	  and	  their	  critics	  are	  often	  ill	  formed.	  This	  happens	  when	  the	  socially	  constructed	  kinds	  to	  which	  the	  critics	  refer,	  and	  those	  to	  which	  biologically	  inclined	  refer,	  are	  not	  coextensive.	  Consider:	  what	  a	  biological	  taxonomist	  refers	  to	  by	  using	  race	  names	  is	  sometimes	  not	  what	  the	  social	  constructionist	  has	  in	  mind.	  Although	  this	  suggests	  that	  parties	  to	  some	  of	  these	  debates	  are	  talking	  past	  one	  another,	  a	  different	  interpretation	  is	  that	  they	  tacitly	  have	  a	  normative	  disagreement	  about	  which	  kinds	  social	  scientists	  should	  focus	  on	  and	  analyze.	  Uncovering	  these	  tacit	  normative	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disagreements	  has	  motivated	  some	  parties	  to	  these	  debates	  to	  change	  their	  argumentative	  strategies,	  focusing	  on	  crucial	  normative	  points	  without	  epistemic	  or	  metaphysical	  distractions.	  This	  is	  one	  place,	  for	  instance,	  where	  practical	  concerns	  about	  the	  political	  dangers	  of	  applications	  of	  biological	  essentialisms	  have	  traction	  that	  they	  cannot	  have	  when	  it	  is	  the	  mere	  truth	  of	  those	  essentialisms	  that	  is	  in	  question.	  	  But	  even	  liberalized	  biological	  essentialisms	  often	  seem	  to	  fail	  to	  account	  for	  the	  kinds	  that	  interest	  social	  scientists,	  because,	  as	  social	  constructivists	  argue,	  the	  explanatory	  causes	  of	  the	  boundaries	  of	  these	  kinds	  are	  social.	  This	  biological	  vs.	  social	  issue	  is	  primarily	  empirical.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  an	  empirical	  platitude	  that	  oppressive	  political	  systems	  are	  important	  causes	  of	  some	  of	  the	  gender	  and	  race	  distinctions	  that	  social	  science	  recognizes.	  	  It	  is	  crucial	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  social	  constructionism	  along	  these	  lines	  is	  consistent	  with	  real,	  social	  (rather	  than	  or	  also	  biological),	  and	  HPC	  essentialist	  accounts	  of	  some	  social	  kinds.	  The	  realism	  in	  any	  such	  essentialism	  only	  requires	  that	  the	  properties	  that	  distinguish	  kinds	  are	  or	  correspond	  with	  actual	  causes	  of	  kind	  distinctions.	  It	  does	  not	  matter	  whether	  the	  actions	  of	  people	  and	  social	  groups	  are	  among	  these	  causes.	  The	  only	  social	  constructionism	  that	  is	  incompatible	  with	  a	  liberalized	  real	  essentialism	  is	  the	  extreme	  sort	  on	  which	  social	  kind	  distinctions	  derive	  only	  from	  the	  mere	  beliefs	  (not	  actions)	  of	  social	  theorizers.	  	  The	  main	  motivation	  for	  pursuing	  liberalized	  real	  essentialist	  accounts	  of	  social	  kinds,	  whether	  biological	  or	  social,	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  socially	  sensitive	  scientific	  realist’s	  ground	  for	  well-­‐confirmed	  generalizations	  that	  range	  over	  those	  kinds.	  These	  generalizations	  nearly	  always	  have	  exceptions,	  as	  expected	  on	  a	  suitably	  liberalized	  essentialism.	  But	  some	  of	  the	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versions	  of	  metaphysical	  essentialism	  described	  above	  allow	  a	  realist	  interpretation	  that	  permits	  exceptions.	  And	  of	  course,	  other	  avenues	  to	  a	  realist	  interpretation	  may	  be	  open	  without	  utilizing	  essentialism	  at	  all.	  Likewise,	  if	  realism	  fails	  this	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  related	  to	  essentialism.	  	  
Psychological	  Essentialisms	  Unlike	  the	  philosophical	  essentialisms	  discussed	  above,	  psychological	  essentialisms	  concern	  which	  essentialisms	  (if	  any)	  people	  tend	  to	  believe	  or	  imply,	  regardless	  of	  which	  of	  these	  beliefs	  are	  true	  or	  justified.	  Psychological	  essentialisms	  still	  have	  philosophical	  aspects	  and	  applications	  though,	  and	  the	  social	  sciences,	  including	  cognitive	  anthropology,	  ethnography,	  and	  various	  fields	  in	  psychology,	  often	  study	  them.	  	  The	  “classical	  view”	  of	  the	  psychology	  of	  everyday	  category	  concepts	  says	  that	  we	  use	  these	  as	  though	  we	  define	  them	  by	  tacit	  appeal	  to	  sets	  of	  singly	  necessary	  and	  jointly	  sufficient	  conditions	  for	  instantiating	  the	  concepts.	  This	  suggests	  that	  most	  people	  are	  
metaphysical	  essentialists	  of	  one	  stripe	  or	  another	  about	  everyday	  categories.	  Experiments	  beginning	  in	  the	  1970s	  initiated	  several	  attacks	  on	  and	  alternatives	  to	  this	  view.	  For	  instance,	  researchers	  have	  suggested	  that	  instead	  we	  are	  (sometimes	  from	  early	  childhood)	  
presumptive	  scientific	  essentialists	  about	  at	  least	  some	  categories,	  such	  as	  biological	  ones,	  or	  race	  and	  ethnicity	  categories.	  That	  is,	  we	  assign	  things	  to	  categories	  on	  the	  presumption	  that	  there	  is	  some	  set	  of	  underlying,	  typically	  unobservable,	  features	  that	  they	  uniquely	  share	  and	  which	  causally	  explain	  many	  of	  the	  observable	  features	  characterizing	  the	  category.	  Authors	  often	  claim	  this	  widespread	  “essentializing	  tendency”	  is	  innate	  and	  evolved,	  part	  of	  a	  strategy	  to	  infer	  generalizations	  from	  experience.	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Nick	  Haslam	  and	  Jennifer	  Whelan	  review	  a	  host	  of	  empirical	  studies	  that	  argue	  that	  many	  people	  are	  scientific	  (and	  often	  genetic)	  essentialists	  in	  this	  way	  about	  several	  social	  categories,	  including	  “AIDS	  patient”,	  “Jews”,	  “gay	  man”	  (and	  other	  sexual	  orientation	  categories),	  gender	  categories	  (especially	  “woman”),	  personality	  categories,	  race	  and	  ethnicity	  categories,	  and	  categories	  of	  mental	  disorder.	  Two	  clusters	  of	  philosophical	  points	  about	  these	  studies	  are	  noteworthy.	  First,	  critics	  have	  noted	  that	  many	  of	  these	  studies	  are	  not	  appropriately	  sensitive	  to	  the	  sorts	  of	  distinctions	  between	  essentialist	  claims	  highlighted	  above.	  Although	  some	  psychologists	  such	  as	  Frank	  Keil	  have	  tried	  to	  test	  between	  crude	  essentialisms	  and	  nuanced	  essentialist	  positions	  (such	  as	  the	  HPC	  kinds	  view)	  with	  respect	  folk	  beliefs	  about	  
everyday	  objects	  and	  biological	  kinds,	  research	  on	  social	  categories	  has	  not	  reached	  the	  same	  level	  of	  conceptual	  sophistication.	  There	  is	  a	  concern	  that	  this	  has	  compromised	  its	  conclusions.	  Second,	  many	  of	  the	  studies	  of	  folk	  scientific	  essentialism	  about	  social	  kinds	  purport	  to	  show	  that	  scientific	  essentialist	  thinking	  about	  some	  social	  categories	  generates	  stereotyping	  and	  prejudice.	  For	  instance,	  Nick	  Haslam	  and	  Sheri	  Levy	  find	  a	  correlation	  between	  a)	  the	  essentialist	  belief	  that	  the	  category	  “gay	  man”	  is	  discrete,	  and	  b)	  anti-­‐gay	  attitudes	  towards	  gay	  men.	  They	  note	  that	  researchers	  often	  interpret	  this	  sort	  of	  result	  to	  indicate	  that	  certain	  aspects	  of	  essentialist	  thinking	  about	  the	  category	  “gay	  man”	  are	  
sources	  of	  anti-­‐gay	  attitudes	  about	  gay	  men,	  and	  that	  this	  helps	  account	  for	  those	  attitudes.	  However,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  find	  anything	  in	  such	  studies	  that	  justifies	  the	  inference	  from	  a	  correlation	  between	  aspects	  of	  essentialist	  thinking	  and	  prejudice,	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  aspects	  of	  essentialist	  thinking	  cause	  or	  explain	  prejudice.	  For	  instance,	  to	  adapt	  one	  of	  Nick	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Haslam’s	  and	  Sheri	  Levy’s	  own	  remarks,	  we	  need	  finer-­‐grained	  empirical	  work	  to	  tell	  whether	  some	  essentialist	  responses	  made	  by	  study	  participants	  are	  (however	  irrational)	  
post-­‐hoc	  defenses	  of	  prior	  or	  otherwise-­‐caused	  prejudice.	  	  Suppose	  that	  such	  further	  studies	  happen	  to	  justify	  the	  causal	  claims	  about	  essentialist	  thinking.	  A	  further	  caution	  is	  known	  to	  arise.	  Researchers	  sometimes	  appeal	  to	  such	  causal	  claims	  to	  support	  negative	  assessment	  of	  essentialist	  beliefs.	  Ironically,	  this	  appeal	  commits	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  naturalistic	  fallacy	  that	  the	  researchers	  are	  tacitly	  or	  explicitly	  criticizing.	  From	  any	  putative	  essentialist	  facts	  about	  social	  categories,	  no	  justifications	  of	  normative	  prejudice	  follow.	  Likewise,	  from	  any	  putative	  facts	  about	  essentialist	  thinking	  causing	  prejudice,	  no	  justifications	  of	  normative	  dismissal	  of	  essentialist	  belief	  follows.	  In	  the	  relevant	  cases,	  social	  policy	  would	  be	  better	  justified	  and	  probably	  practically	  more	  effective	  if	  it	  corrected	  the	  object	  of	  its	  concern,	  shifting	  from	  essentialist	  belief,	  to	  dubious	  inferences	  from	  essentialist	  belief.	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